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THE FAULT WITH COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE 
PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL COMPARISONS 
IN A MODIFIED COMPARATIVE 
FAULT JURISDICTION 
MICHAEL K. STEENSONt 
Minnesota courts have interpreted the Minnesota Comparative 
Fault statute as requiring comparison of a plaintiff's negligence with 
the individual negligence of each defendant. Exceptions to this rule 
involve joint venture cases. This Article examines the individual com-
parison rule and explores an alternative rule which provides for a 
comparison of the plaintiff's negligence with the aggregate negligence 
of the defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1969, Minnesota adopted a comparative negligence stat-
ute modeled after the Wisconsin statute. It provided that a 
plaintiff's contributory negligence would not be a bar to recov-
ery unless the plaintiff's negligence was equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the person from whom recovery was 
sought. In multiple party litigation, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court interpreted the statute to require comparison of the 
plaintiff's negligence with the individual negligence of each 
defendant, rather than with the combined negligence of the 
defendants as a unit. The only situation where the court com-
pared the plaintiff's negligence with the aggregate negligence 
of the defendants was when the defendants engaged in a joint 
venture. 
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature amended the compara-
tive negligence statute, converting it into a comparative fault 
statute with new rules of loss reallocation. The supreme court 
has continued to recognize the individual comparison rule, yet 
it has also expanded the aggregate comparison rule to include 
not only joint ventures, but also other joint duty cases. 
The individual comparison rule, coupled with the reality of 
multiple party tort litigation, creates problems because of its 
rigidity. The current approach, which liberalizes the rule only 
if a joint duty is present, is ill-suited to resolve the variety of 
situations which may justify aggregation of fault. 
The focus of this Article is on the individual comparison 
rule, with a particular emphasis on Minnesota law. The Article 
will first establish the differences between the unit and individ-
ual comparison rules, as well as explain the policy justifications 
for the rules. The Article will then examine the Minnesota 
comparative fault background, with a detailed look at the legis-
lative history behind the 1978 amendments to the comparative 
fault statute. Then, assuming that the basic rule is the individ-
ual comparison rule, the Article will examine a variety of situa-
tions where application of a unit rule exception may be 
justified. Finally, the author suggests that the legislature 
amend the comparative fault statute and incorporate a unit ' 
rule for all indivisible hazard cases. 
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I. MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE INDIVIDUAL 
COMPARISON RULE AND THE UNIT OR COMBINATION 
RULE - SETTING THE STAGE 
3 
Most of the debates over comparative fault forms have fo-
cused on pure versus modified comparative fault. Once the 
decision is made to adopt modified comparative fault,l the fo-
cus of the courts and legislatures is on whether to adopt an 
individual comparison or to adopt a unit or combination rule. 
The courts usually make this decision by interpreting the legis-
lative intent and the policies that influenced the decision.2 
The policy arguments for each rule are based primarily on 
the argued unfairness that would result from the alternative 
rule. The unit or combination rule (unit rule) has been criti-
cized because it frequently results in harshness and injustice. 
The typical case involves one plaintiff and two defendants, with 
the plaintiff more at fault than one of the defendants. For ex-
ample, assume that the plaintiff is twenty-five percent at fault, 
defendant one is ten percent at fault, and defendant two is 
sixty-five percent at fault. If defendant two is unable to pay 
because of insolvency, then defendant one, ten percent at fault 
and less at fault than the plaintiff, must pay the plaintiff sev-
1. There are four types of comparative fault: 
(1) the slight-gross form (recovery only ifplaintifPs negligence was slight in 
comparison to defendant's); (2) the even division form (dividing the dam-
ages evenly or pro-rata among the parties); (3) one of the two modified 
forms (plaintiff can recover reduced damages if his negligence was either 
(a) "not as great as" or (b) "not greater than" that of defendant); (4) the 
"pure form" (diminished recovery allowed even though plaintiff's negli-
gence is greater than that of defendant). 
Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 THE FORUM 379, 385 (1976). 
Courts adopting the pure form of comparative fault assert that the modified sys-
tems distort the very principle of comparative fault; specifically, "persons are respon-
sible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result." Li v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 
(1975). 
2. See, e.g., Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 885-90 (Colo. 
1983) (en bane) (unit rule of comparing negligence best furthers policy of compen-
sating plaintiff when plaintiff is less than 50% at fault); Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic 
Tours, Ltd., 64 Hawaii 404-05,642 P.2d 930, 932-33 (1982) (court adopted unit rule 
stating Wisconsin's individual comparison rule is contrary to spirit and policy of Ha-
waii laws); Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1,4-5,624 P.2d 383, 387-88 (1981) (indi-
vidual comparison rule is law of Idaho since legislature intended to adopt 
Wisconsin's individual comparison rule); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
679 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1984) (under Utah Comparative Negligence Act, total negli-
gence of all defendants should be compared with that of plaintiff). 
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enty-five percent of the damages.s 
The response to this criticism is that the outcome is not a 
function of comparative fault, but rather, it is a function of the 
rule of joint and severalliability.4 The main concern in indi-
vidual comparison situations is that a defendant, who is only 
slightly at fault, may bear a disproportionate share of the liabil-
ity if the primary defendant's share of the judgment becomes 
uncollectible.5 For example, in a case where the plaintiff is ten 
percent at fault, defendant one is fifteen percent at fault, and 
defendant two is seventy-five percent at fault, if defendant two 
is unable to pay its share of the judgment, then defendant one 
will be liable for ninety percent of the plaintiff's damages, even 
though only fifteen percent at fault. 6 
The unit rule is also criticized because it permits a plaintiff . 
who is less at fault than the cumulative fault of the defendants, 
but more at fault than each defendant, to recover against each 
of the defendants. A plaintiff is not entitled to recover against 
a single defendant if the plaintiff is more at fault than that de-
fendant. The argument is premised on the belief that it is in-
consistent to permit the plaintiff to recover against those 
defendants when the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against 
3. See Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 387-89 (court stated unit rule unjust 
because if "the [defendant] was unable to obtain contribution ... he would wind up 
paying the great majority of the damages of a plaintiff whose negligence is two 1/2 
times greater than his own."). 
4. See Mountain Mobile Mix, 660 P.2d at 889 ("The unfairness that accrues when 
one tortfeasor is impecunious is a consequence of the doctrine of joint and several 
liability and not of the combined comparison rule we have adopted."); Jensen, 679 
P.2d at 909-10 n.3. 
Joint and several liability is the doctrine which grants responsibility to each 
tortfeasor for the entire harm caused by two or more persons acting independently 
or in concert. Thus, if A and B, acting either together or independently, caused inju-
ries to C, then C could choose to obtain judgment against B alone. B would then 
bear the full loss of compensating C for his injuries. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. 
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th 
ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON). See also Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio 
St. 307, 311, 25 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1940) ("[W]hen the negligence of two or more 
persons concurs to produce a single individual injury, such persons are jointly and 
severally liable, and the existence of common duty, common design or concerted 
action is not essential"); Note, Multiple Party Litigation Under Comparative Negligence in 
Kansas--Damage Apportionment as a Replacement/or Joint and Several Liability, 16 WASH-
BURN LJ. 672 (1977) (comparative negligence is a compromise between compensat-
ing an injured plaintiff and making the plaintiff totally responsible for his own safety). 
5. See Jensen, 679 P.2d at 909-10 n.3. 
6. See id. 
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a single defendant who is less at fault. 7 Courts adopting the 
unit rule find no such inconsistency.8 
The criticisms of the individual comparison rule are more 
varied. The rule is criticized because it reintroduces contribu-
tory negligence as a complete defense in a variety of situations 
where there are multiple defendants.9 If the purpose of a fifty 
percent cutoff rule is to deny recovery to a plaintiff who is 
equally at fault in causing his own injuries, it is arguably incon-
sistent to make the plaintiff's right to recovery dependent 
upon the number of defendants. Io The problem is com-
pounded if the jurisdiction requires the fault of absent persons 
to be considered in the apportionment of fault. I I 
The rule is also criticized because it is inconsistent with the 
rules governing contribution claims. A defendant more at 
fault than a co-defendant is entitled to recover contribution 
from that defendant. I2 A plaintiff more at fault than a defend-
ant, however, is not permitted to recover from that defendant 
under the individual comparison rule. Is 
Legislatures and courts have opted either for the unit rule or 
the individual comparison rule. If the individual comparison 
rule is adopted, then only a limited exception to the rule is 
Id. 
7. See Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 387. 
It would be incongruous to suggest that where there is one defendant and 
one plaintiff, and both are found to be equally negligent (50%), the plaintiff 
recovers nothing, but where there are two defendants and one plaintiff, and 
all three are found to be equally negligent (33 1/3%), the plaintiff may re-
cover 662/3% of his damages from either defendant. 
8. See jensen, 679 P.2d at 909. 
9. See Mountain Mobile Mix, 660 P.2d at 888. 
10. See iti. 
11. See Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 229 Kan. 465, 472, 625 P.2d 472, 477 
(1981) (stating that the fault of a party who has immunity should "be considered in 
determining the other defendants' percentage of fault and liability."); Lines v. Ryan, 
272 N.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Minn. 1978) (citing Connar v. West Shore Equip. of Mil-
waukee, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 45, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1975» (when apportioning 
negligence, a jury must have opportunity to consider negligence of all parties to the 
transaction) . 
12. See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REv. 150 
(1947); Gregory, Contribution Among joint TortJeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 WIS. L. 
REv. 365; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 
(1932). 
13. See, e.g., Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 10, 624 P.2d at 392 (Bistline, j., dissenting). 
"Idaho's comparative negligence law is premised on the proposition that a plaintiff 
whose damages are as much the result of its own negligence as that of the defendant 
ought not to recover, but the parties should bear their own losses." Id. 
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recognized. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Reber v. 
Hanson,14 there must be individual comparisons of the fault in 
multiple party cases, except in situations where "the duty [in-
volved] was joint, the opportunity to protect was equal, and as 
a matter of law neither the obligation nor the breach of it was 
divisible." 15 
The legislative and judicial experience with comparative 
negligence and fault in Minnesota is similar to the experience 
in other states. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the 
comparative negligence statute to require individual compari-
sons of negligence. 16 Legislative attempts to adopt a unit or 
combination rule in 197817 and 198518 failed, thereby leaving 
the individual comparison rule as the primary rule in Minne-
sota. The only clear exception to the rule is the joint duty ex-
ception. 19 The next section examines the Minnesota history in 
greater depth. 
II. THE MINNESOTA BACKGROUND 
A. Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence 
In 1969, Minnesota adopted a comparative negligence stat-
ute.20 Subdivision one of section 604.01 of the statute read as 
follows: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an ac-
tion by any person or his legal representative to recover 
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as 
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is 
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the 
person recovering. . . . When there are two or more per-
sons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be 
in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable 
to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly 
14. 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952). 
15. Id. at 638,51 N.W.2d at 508. 
16. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 246, 207 N.W.2d 
706, 709 (1973). 
17. See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
19. See Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798-800 (Minn. 1982). 
20. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1984». 
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and severally liable for the whole award.21 
The first case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the statute required individual or aggregate 
comparisons of fault was Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, 
Inc. 22 The plaintiff in Krengel injured her ankle when she 
tripped on the riser of an automatic photo booth in a dime 
store. She brought suit against the dime store, the photo 
booth manufacturer, and the installerlservicer of the machine. 
The jury apportioned thirty percent of the fault to the plaintiff, 
thirty percent to the dime store, thirty percent to the manufac-
turer, and ten percent to the machine installerlservicer.23 
The court stated that the facts of the case indicated "a com-
mon or joint duty to protect [the plaintiff], ifnot, in fact, ajoint 
enterprise. "24 The court found that the prerequisites of a joint 
venture were met, making the members of the venture indistin-
guishable for liability purposes: 
As in many cases, here the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts. Defendants undertook a common purpose, to in-
stall and maintain the booth and to extract a profit from the 
selling of photos. The resulting common duty andjoint op-
portunity to protect customers translates into equal and 
overall liability. 25 
21. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. I (1969) (amended by Act of Apr. 5 1978, ch. 
738, 1978 Minn. Laws 836). 
22. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973). 
23. /d. at 202, 203 N.W.2d at 843. 
24. Id. at 209, 203 N.W.2d at 847. 
25. Id. at 210, 203 N.W.2d at 847. The court has not always clearly distinguished 
between joint ventures and joint enterprises. In Delgado V. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 
479 (Minn. 1980), however, the court clarified the distinctions. The plaintiff in Del-
gado was accidentally blinded by a shot fired by a member of a hunting party that was 
on the plaintiff's property without his knowledge or consent. Id. at 482. 
The defendant who fired the shot settled with the plaintiff. One of the issues in 
the case was whether the fault of that defendant could be imputed to the other mem-
bers of the hunting party. Another issue was whether the defendants in the hunting 
party were engaged in a joint enterprise so that the fault of the defendant who fired 
the shot should have been imputed to the other defendants in the party. The court 
stated that two elements are necessary for ajoint enterprise. "(I) a mutual undertak-
ing for a common purpose, and (2) a right to a voice in the direction and control of 
the means used to carry out the common purpose." Id. at 482. The court distin-
guished joint ventures in a footnote, noting that a joint venture arises in business 
transactions. The four elements for a joint venture are: "(I) contributions by all 
parties, (2) joint proprietorship and control, (3) sharing of profits but not necessarily 
of losses, and (4) a contract." Id. at 482 n.2. 
The joint venture standards were inapplicable in Delgado. Applying the joint en-
terprise standards, the court concluded that no joint enterprise was established 
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As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to recover seventy percent 
of her damages from the jointly liable defendants. 
In Marier v. Memorial Rescue Service, Inc.,26 the court made 
clear its intention to adhere to the limited exception for aggre-
gate comparisons of fault established in Krengel. Marier was a 
three vehicle collision involving a truck, an ambulance, and a 
car. The plaintiff.-the driver of the car, and the two defend-
ants were each found to be one-third at fault. 27 The compara-
tive negligence statute barred recovery if the plaintiff's 
negligence was equal to or greater than the negligence of the 
defendant and the plaintiff's negligence was equal to the negli-
gence of each defendant. Consequently, the court held that 
the plaintiff was barred from recovery. 28 In so holding, the 
court refused to extend the unit rule to cases not meeting the 
joint liability standards established in Krengel. 29 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Marier court followed Wisconsin law, which re-
quired individual comparisons of fault, rather than the ap-
proach of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Walton v. Tull, gO 
where the court required aggregate comparisons of fault.gl 
under the facts of the case, because the group of hunters was engaged in a "recrea-
tional activity on a gratuitous and voluntary basis, there was no sharing of equipment 
or expenses and each person had control of his own gun." Id. at 483. 
Whether a joint enterprise or a joint venture, the result should arguably be the 
same. In ajoint enterprise case, the fault of one member of the enterprise is imputed 
to the remaining members of the enterprise. Those parties are vicariously liable for 
the fault of the member of the enterprise who was actively at fault. In the Delgado 
situation, if the hunters had been deemed to be engaging in a joint enterprise, the 
fault of the hunter who fired the shot would have been imputed to the other hunters, 
even though they were not actively at fault. As in other imputed fault or vicarious 
liability cases, there is no basis for splitting the fault that would be assigned to the 
entity as an enterprise. Accordingly, the fault charged to the enterprise should be 
compared with the fault of the plaintiff. Individual comparisons of fault would be 
impossible and inappropriate. 
26. 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973). 
27. Id. at 243, 207 N.W.2d at 707. 
28. Id. at 246, 207 N.W.2d at 709. The court noted, however, that "the legisla-
ture might wish to consider the 1971 amendment to the Wisconsin comparative neg-
ligence act which permitted recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence was not greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." Id. (discussing 
WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1971». 
29. Id. 
30. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962). 
31. Id. at 893-95,356 S.W.2d at 26-27; see Marier, 296 Minn. at 246, 207 N.W.2d 
at 709. 
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B. The 1978 Amendments 
The comparative negligence statute was amended in 1978.82 
The amendments made three significant changes to the stat-
ute, but they did not change the Marier individual comparison 
rule.88 The legislative debates over the amendments raised 
questions concerning the desirability of the individual com-
parison rule. An examination of both the amendments and 
the policy debate demonstrate the impact of the 1978 
amendments. 
The first change was the inclusion of a broad definition of 
"fault" in the statute.84 Despite the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's application of the comparative negligence statute to 
strict products liability claims in 1977,85 the new definition of 
"fault" significantly expanded the theories of recovery and de-
fenses subject to comparison. 
The second change was the adoption of the Wisconsin-mod-
ified form of comparative fault. Under the original compara-
tive negligence statute, a claimant was barred from recovery if 
his negligence equaled or exceeded the negligence of the per-
son from whom recovery was sought. 86 The comparative fault 
statute now provides that a claimant will not be barred from 
recovery unless his fault is greater than the fault of the person 
from whom recovery is sought.87 
32. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-10,1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-41 (codifed 
as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.04 (1984». 
33. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified 
as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1984». 
34. The amendment to the Comparative Fault Act created the following defini-
tion of "fault": 
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a 
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, 
unreasonable assumpt~on of risk not constituting an express consent, mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate 
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the 
basis for liability and to contributory fault. 
Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1984». 
35. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977). 
36. The original comparative negligence act specifically provided that a claim-
ant's "negligence shall not bar recovery in an action ... if such negligence was not 
as great as the negligence of the person from whom recovery is sought .... " Act of 
May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § I, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, 
subd. 1 (1969». 
37. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, (codified as amended 
at MINN. STAT. § 604.01. subd. 1 (1984». The 1978 amendment to MINN. STAT. 
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The third change in the statute was the adoption of a unique 
loss reallocation provision. The provision requires the reallo-
cation of a defendant's uncollectible share of a judgment to the 
other litigants, including the claimant, according to their re-
spective percentages of fault. 3s The loss reallocation rule, 
however, does not provide for the reallocation ofloss in prod-
ucts liability cases. In such cases, the uncollectible share of a 
party in the chain of distribution and manufacture will be real-
located only to the other parties in the chain.3g The loss real-
location provision as enacted reads as follows: 
Subdivision 1. When two or more persons are jointly lia-
ble, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the 
percentage of fault attributable to each, except that each is 
jointly and severally liable for the whole award. 
Subd.2. Upon motion made not later than one year after 
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all 
or part of a party's equitable share of the obligation is un-
collectible from that party and shall reallocate any uncol-
lectible amount among the other parties, including a 
claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages 
of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless 
subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the 
claimant on the judgment. 
Subd. 3. In the case of a claim arising from the manufac-
ture, sale, use or consumption of a product, an amount un-
collectible from any person in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution shall be reallocated among all other persons in 
the chain of manufacture and distribution but not among 
the claimant or others at fault who are not in the chain of 
manufacture or distribution of the product. Provided, how-
ever, that a person whose fault is less than that of a claimant 
is liable to the ~laimant only for that portion of the judg-
ment which represents the percentage of fault attributable 
to him.40 
Two of the changes in the comparative fault statute were the 
result of senate floor amendments to the comparative fault bill. 
§ 604.01, subd. 1 eliminated the clause "as great as" and inserted the clause "greater 
than" into the first sentence of the subdivision. 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839. 
38. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1984». 
39. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1984». 
40. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws, 836, 840 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1984». 
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The ordering of these amendments is important in under-
standing the legislative intent underlying the statute. 
At the time the bill was considered on the senate floor, it 
provided for aggregate comparisons of fault. The fault of the 
claimant was to be compared with the fault of the persons from 
whom recovery is sought.41 
At this point the bill did not contain the last sentence of sub-
division three of section 604.02, but the remainder of the loss 
reallocation subdivisions was the same. The last sentence of 
subdivision three was the first floor amendment to the compar-
ative fault bill. The amendment followed a substantial amount 
of discussion over the problems of low volume sellers in prod-
ucts liability cases. In the event of the insolvency of the prod-
uct manufacturer, the seller would be held liable for the entire 
damages award to the plaintiff.42 This result would occur even 
where the low volume seller's fault was found to be less than 
the fault of the plaintiff. For example, in a case where the 
plaintiff is injured by a defective product, the plaintiff could be 
found five percent, at fault, the product manufacturer ninety-
four percent at fault, and the intermediate seller one percent at 
fault. If the manufacturer could not pay, the intermediate 
seller would be responsible for ninety-five percent of the plain-
tiff's damages. To avoid the problems that would result, the 
last sentence of subdivision three was added.43 This sentence 
eliminated the rule of joint and several liability in cases where 
a products liability defendant is less at fault than the plaintiff. 
In such cases, the defendant's liability is limited to its percent-
age of fault. 
Although this change addressed at least part of the problem, 
Senator Sieloff pointed out that the amendment would not 
touch other civil actions, such as automobile accident cases.44 
To rectify the problem, he offered an amendment that re-
41. See 1978 MINN. SJ. 5178. 
42. See Debate on H.F. No. 338 Before the Minnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Leg., 1978 
Sess., Mar. 16, 1978 (audio tape) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review 
office) [hereinafter cited as Senate Debate on H.F. No. 338). 
43. 1978 MINN. SJ. 5178. The amended last sentence of section 604.02, subdivi-
sion 3 states: "Provided, however, that a person whose fault is less than that of a 
claimant is liable to the claimaint only for that portion of the judgment which repre-
sents the percentage of fault attributable to him." MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 
(1984). 
44. See Senate Debate on H.F. No. 338, supra note 41. 
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turned the bill to the individual comparison rule that was the 
prevailing law under the comparative negligence statute. 
The arguments presented by Senator Sieloff in favor of the 
individual comparison rule and by Senator Davies in favor of 
the unit rule, illustrate the philosophical basis for the split of 
opinion on the issue in the senate. The arguments are similar 
to those considered by the courts in deciding whether the indi-
vidual or unit comparison rule is justified. Senator Davies ar-
gued that an aggregate comparison of fault was justified, based 
upon his view that the tort system is a compensation system.45 
Under this view, it is irrelevant which defendant satisfies the 
judgment because the plaintiff's right to recover should be 
based on need, regardless of the number of defendants in-
volved in the litigation. 
In response, Senator Sieloff argued that tort law should not 
be administered like a welfare system, and that fault is still the 
basis of the tort litigation system in Minnesota.46 Senator Sie-
loWs view prevailed, and the bill was amended a second time 
to provide for a comparison of the fault of the claimant to the 
fault of the person from whom recovery is sought.47 
The third floor amendment to the bill was a change to the 
Wisconsin-modified form of comparative fault.48 Under the 
Wisconsin-modified form, a claimant will not be barred from 
recovery unless his fault is greater than the fault of the person 
from whom recovery is sought.49 
The legislative history is important in understanding that the 
last sentence of subdivision three of section 604.02 does not 
support the aggregation of fault in products liability cases. 
The subdivision states that a defendant in the chain of manu-
facture and distribution is liable to a plaintiff who is more at 
fault, but only for its percentage of fault. 50 In conclusion, it 
seems clear from the legislative history of the amendments that 
the legislature intended to carry over the individual compari-
son rule to the comparative fault statute. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. 1978 MINN. SJ. 5178. The amendment specifically eliminated the phrase "to-
tal fault attributable to the persons," and inserted the phrase ''fault of the per.;on." Id. 
48. [d. 
49. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1983). 
50. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3. 
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C. The 1985 Proposed Amendment to the Act. 
In 1985, a bill to amend the comparative fault statute was 
introduced in the legislature.51 As initially introduced, the bill 
would have barred recovery only if the claimant's fault was 
greater than the fault of the persons from whom recovery is 
sought. The bill thus adopted the unit rule in all cases. The 
civil law subcommittee of the senate judiciary committee 
amended the bill to limit the liability of a defendant less at fault 
than the claimant to the defendant's percentage of fault. The 
bill would have adopted the unit rule in subdivision one of sec-
tion 604.01: 
Subdivision 1. Contributory fault shall not bar recovery 
in an action by any person or his legal representative to re-
cover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, only if the contributory fault was Ret: 
greater than the combined fault of Hle person all persons 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault at-
tributable to the person recovering. The court may, and 
when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find 
separate special verdicts determining the amount of dam-
ages and the percentage of fault attributable to each party; 
and the court shall then reduce the amount of damages in 
proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person 
recovering. 52 
Subdivision one of section 604.02 would have contained the 
limitation on liability: 
Subdivision 1. When two or more persons are jointly lia-
ble, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the 
percentage of fault attributable to each, except that each is 
jointly and severally liable for the whole award. Provided, 
however, that a person whose fault is less than that of a claimant is 
liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment that repre-
sents the percentage of fault attributable to that person. 53 
The bill would have also deleted the last sentence of subdivi-
sion three of section 604.02, which limited the liability of a de-
fendant whose fault is less than the fault of the claimant in 
5l. S.F. No. 560, H.F. No. 984, 74th Minn. Leg., 1985 Sess. (copy on file at the 
William Mitchell Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as S.F. No. 560]. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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products liability cases.54 The last sentence of subdivision one 
would have eliminated joint and several liability for those de-
fendants found less at fault than the claimant. In such cases, 
the defendant less at fault than the claimant would be liable 
only for its share of the judgment. 
The bill would have eliminated one of the primary com-
plaints of the unit rule-that the unit rule can impose liability 
on a defendant for the entire damages award, less the plain-
tiff's percentage of fault, when the defendant is liable for only 
a small percentage of fault. The bill would have ensured that 
the defendant would pay only according to its percentage of 
fault. The bill, as amended, passed the civil law subcommit-
tee55 and the senate56 and house judiciary committees. 57 It did 
not, however, reach the floor of either house. 
Those testifying before the senate and house subcommittees 
expressed concern over the impact of the bill. The primary 
concern was that insurance rates would rise with the adoption 
of an aggregate comparison rule.58 No statistical data in either 
Minnesota or any state adopting either the aggregate compari-
son rule or pure comparative fault was offered to support the 
claim. The arguments in favor of the bill tracked the argu-
ments which the courts have accepted in adopting the unit 
rule. Attention focused on the fact that the plaintiff's chances 
for recovery diminish depending on the number of defendants 
joined in the litigation.59 
One of the primary concerns expressed was over the prod-
ucts liability or hazardous waste cases. In situations where a 
product passes through the hands of several companies in the 
chain of manufacture and distribution, or where a hazard is 
created by the conduct of several manufacturers, as in the as-
bestos cases, the problem a plaintiff faces is that the dangerous 
product or hazardous substance that caused his injuries is not 
54. Id. 
55. The bill passed the civil law subcommittee of the senate on March 26, 1985. 
COMMITIEE BOOK OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITIEE 15 (1985-86). 
56. See 1985 MINN. SJ. 1205 (unbound supp.). 
57. See 1985 MINN. HJ. 2460 (unbound supp.). 
58. See generally Hearings on S.F. 560 Before the Civ. L. Subcomm. of the Sen. Judiciary 
Comm., 74th Minn. Leg., 1985 Sess., Mar. 26, 1985; (audio tape) (copy on file at Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Civil Law Subcommittee Hearings]; 
Hearing on H.F. 984 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 74th Minn. Leg., 1985 Sess., Apr. 
22, 1985 (audio tape). 
59. See Civil Law Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 58. 
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the focus of the comparison, but rather, the number of defend-
ants who contributed to the hazard or failed to discover the 
product defect. There was some support, primarily by Senator 
Sieloff, for the proposition that aggregation or a unit rule 
would be justified in such cases. There was also significant 
concern that an unlimited aggregation rule would apply to sit-
uations such as automobile accident cases, where unrelated de-
fendants, through concurrent acts of negligence, cause injury 
to the plaintiff.60 
The approach taken in this Article responds to that concern. 
Assuming the general application of the individual comparison 
rule, this Article takes the position that there are various situa-
tions, such as products liability cases, where aggregation is jus-
tified, either because the duty owed by multiple defendants to 
the plaintiff is joint or common, or because the hazard created 
by the defendants is indivisible. The theory transcends the 
limited joint duty exception adopted by the Wisconsin Sup-
reme Court,61 but falls short of an aggregation rule such as 
that adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court.62 
The remainder of this Article assumes the individual com-
parison rule as a starting point, but supports a method of anal-
ysis that permits use of the unit rule in cases such as those that . 
were the concern of the legislative committees considering the 
aggregation bill. 
III. POTENTIAL ApPLICATIONS OF THE UNIT RULE 
The types of situations that may justify application of a unit 
rule range from vicarious liability cases, the easiest type of 
case, to cases in which two or more parties have acted indepen-
dently to create an indivisible hazard that causes harm to the 
plaintiff, the most difficult type of case. Fault may be imputed 
in certain situations. In others, lack of the necessary relation-
ship between the defendants precludes imputing fault from 
one defendant to another. The nature of the relationship be-
tween defendants or the way a particular hazard arises, may 
still justify application of a unit rule. 
60. Id. 
61. See Reber, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505. 
62. See Walton, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20. 
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A. Vicarious Liability 
The most obvious cases that justify treating two or more de-
fendants as a single unit are situations involving vicarious lia-
bility; specifically, motor vehicle driver and owner or master 
and servant cases.68 In such cases, the active fault of the motor 
vehicle driver or servant is imputed to the motor vehicle owner 
or master. Strictly speaking, fault is not aggregated in such sit-
uations. Rather, the fault that would be attributed to the mo-
tor vehicle driver and owner unit, or to the master and servant 
unit is simply not split. As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
stated in Larsen v. Minneapolis Gas CO.,64 a pre-comparative neg-
ligence case: 
Where there are multiple defendants and one or more of 
them is liable to the plaintiff solely on the basis of negli-
gence imputed to it by virtue of its relationship with one of 
the other defendants, the one guilty of the negligent con-
duct and the one to whom the negligence is imputed are to 
be treated as one party for purposes of determining the fair 
share of the verdict each defendant must pay.65 
Although Larsen involved the unit rule in the context of a con-
tribution claim, the outcome must be the same when the issue 
is the comparison of the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of two 
or more defendants where one of the defendants is vicariously 
liable for the active fault of another. 
The reason that fault is not split in vicarious liability cases is 
illustrated in Garbincius v. Boston Edison CO.,66 a diversity case 
that arose out of an accident which resulted in the death of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff's decedent drove his automobile into an 
excavation that was dug by the Charles Contracting Company, 
pursuant to a contract with defendant Boston Edison Com-
pany.67 In a special verdict question, the jury found the dece-
dent five percent at fault, Boston Edison Company thirty-five 
percent at fault, and Charles Contracting sixty percent at 
fault.68 The defendants argued that the jury should have been 
63. Contributory negligence will not be imputed in bailor-bailee, master-servant, 
or joint enterprise cases. See Pierson v. Edstrom, 286 Minn. 164, 174 N.W.2d 712 
(1970). 
64. 282 Minn. 135, 163 N.W.2d 755 (1968). 
65. Id. at 150, 163 N.W.2d 765. 
66. 621 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1980). 
67. Id. at 1173. 
68. Id. 
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instructed to compare the fault of the decedent against each 
defendant separately.69 The court first detennined that Bos-
ton Edison was only vicariously liable and that Boston Edison 
was entitled to indemnity from Charles Contracting.70 As a re-
sult, the court then rejected the defendants' argument that 
there should have been separate comparisons of fault: 
The accident happened because, as the jury found, the 
measures taken to warn of the excavation and guard against 
its danger were not adequate. The warning system con-
sisted of planks at the excavation, wooden horse barricades 
and flashing lights. It was against the adequacy of this 
warning system that decedent's conduct had to be com-
pared. There was no way that it could have been measured 
against each defendant. 71 
Thus, in vicarious liability cases, there is no logical way to split 
the fault of the active tortfeasor from the passive fault of the 
vicariously liable party. 
The vicarious liability issue may arise in many types of cases. 
For example, the issue often arises in master-servant cases, in 
motor vehicle owner and driver cases, in cases involving em-
ployers of independent contractors, or, potentially, in any situ-
ation where a party passively at fault is entitled to indemnity 
from an actively at fault party. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered the problem 
of aggregation in a case involving the liability of an employer 
for the acts of an independent contractor. In Conover v. North-
ero States Power CO.,72 the aggregation issue arose in a case in 
which the plaintiff was an employee of the Donovan Construc-
tion Company, an independent contractor hired by Northern 
States Power Company (NSP) to move certain secondary 
power lines from old poles to new, taller poles.7!! The plaintiff 
was injured when he fell off of one of the old poles, which had 
broken at its base.74 
The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from 
his employer and then brought suit against NSP.75 Donovan 
69. Id. at 1178. 
70. Id. at 1176-77. 
71. Id. at 1178. 
72. 313 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1981). 
73. Id. at 399-400. 
74. Id. at 400. 
75. Id. The suit was a third-party action brought by the plaintiff against NSP 
pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subd. 5. Id. 
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was not made a party to the action, although the trial judge 
submitted the negligence of Donovan to the jury. The jury 
found that NSP was seventy-five percent negligent and that 
Donovan was twenty-five percent negligent.76 Consequently, 
the plaintiff was not negligent according to the jury's 
findings. 77 
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's granting of 
NSP's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in 
the event the judgment was vacated, a new trial. 78 One of the 
issues raised on appeal was whether NSP was vicariously liable 
to the plaintiff for the negligence of NSP's independent con-
tractor, Donovan Construction Company.79 
The supreme court held that NSP was not vicariously liable 
for Donovan's negligence.8o Although the general rule is that 
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the 
negligence of the contractor, there are numerous exceptions to 
the rule. The exceptions are based on the policy that the em-
ployer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for the 
personal safety of another by delegating responsibility to the 
independent contractor for the proper conduct of certain types 
ofwork.81 One example noted by the court is contained in sec-
tion 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement). 
The court quoted the section as follows: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize is likely to create dur-
ing its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others un-
less special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to others (sic) by the failure of the 
contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precau-
tions, even though the employer has provided for such pre-
cautions in the contract or otherwise.82 
The "others" who might be harmed by the work clearly in-




SO. Id. The other issues were whether the trial court erred in holding that NSP 
was not liable to the plaintiff for any personal negligence as a matter of law and 
whether the trial court erred in granting a conditional new trial. Id. 
Sl. /d. at 403-04. 
S2. Id. at 404 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965) (emphasis 
by the court». 
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cludes third persons who might be injured on the job site.83 
The issue was whether employees of independent contractors 
hired to do the work also fit within the term "others."84 Mter 
noting that the authorities on the issue are split, the court con-
cluded that the term "others" does not include employees of 
the independent contractor.85 The court stated that its hold-
ing avoided "needless conceptual and practical difficulties and 
does not give due consideration to the employer-independent 
contractor relationship. "86 The reason behind the nondele-
gable duty rule is to preclude the employer from shifting re-
sponsibility to the independent contractor, by contract, for 
hazardous work that involves a risk of injury to the general 
public and adjoining property owners.87 The court concluded 
that the rule is inapplicable in cases where the injury is sus-
tained by the employee who is under the direction and control 
of the independent contractor.88 
The Conover court was also concerned about the difficulties 
involved in administering a rule that would permit imputation 
of the fault of the independent contractor to the employer 
where the independent contractor's employee sustains injury: 
Under the Restatement rule, it would be said that Dono-
van's 25% negligence consisted of Donovan's breach of 
NSP's nondelegable duty of care for the safety of Donovan's 
employee. If this be so, there are some troublesome conse-
quences. Assume plaintiff had also sued the supplier of the 
pole on a products liability claim. If NSP's duty is labeled 
"nondelegable," it might be argued that Donovan's negli-
gence should be aggregated with NSP's for the purpose of 
comparison with the supplier's fault, and that it might also 
be aggregated for the purpose of comparison with the 
plaintiff's own fault. Moreover, for the purpose of deter-
mining a contractor's contribution under Lambertson v. Cin-
cinnati Corp. . . . the jury would have to distinguish, in 
appropriate cases, between the contractor's breach of his 
own duty and his breach of the employer's nondelegable 
duty. We do not think it desireable, nor necessary, to intro-
duce these kinds of problems into the fault apportionment 




87. Id. at 405. 
88. Id. 
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process here.89 
Conover actually presents an easy case. The duty of the em-
ployer is such that the independent contractor's fault will not 
be imputed to the employer, at least where the injury is to the 
employee of the contractor. It is questionable, however, 
whether the same result would be achieved in a case where the 
complicating factor of the employee's injury is not present. 
The nondelegable duty rule should apply where the injury is to 
a third party. In such cases, the fault of the independent con-
tractor would be imputed to the employer of the contractor 
and the employer would be vicariously liable. As in a vicarious 
liability case, the fault would not be treated any differently 
from a case involving a claim against a motor vehicle owner 
and driver. In both situations, the person to whom the fault is 
imputed is the person who has the ultimate responsibility for 
the damages sustained by the third party. If the employer of 
the contractor is held vicariously liable for the fault of the in-
dependent contractor, then the contractor's fault would have 
to be imputed to the employer. The employer in such a case is 
without personal fault. As in the Larsen case, there is an inade-
quate basis for splitting fault. Absent any personal fault on the 
part of the employer, there is no basis for submitting separate 
questions on the fault of the employer and independent con-
tractor to the jury. 
In summary, in vicarious liability cases where the active fault 
of one party is imputed to a party who is passively at fault, 
there is no basis for splitting fault. Both the actively at fault 
defendant and the defendant or defendants who are vicariously 
liable must be treated as a unit. 
B. Vicarious Liability Coupled with Active Fault 
Complications may arise in cases where the party held vicari-
ously liable is also held personally at fault. One of the court's 
concerns in Conover was that a jury would be required to distin-
guish between the contractor's breach of his own duty and his 
breach of the employer's nondelegable duty, at least in the 
context of a contribution claim by the employer against the 
contractor.90 Other situations could readily arise. For exam-
ple, a motor vehicle owner may be negligent in loaning his car 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 406. 
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to someone who drives the vehicle negligently. The owner is 
vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver, but is also 
liable for negligently entrusting the motor vehicle to the 
driver. The owner's fault consists of active fault and vicarious 
liability. In allocating loss, the jury would be required to con-
sider the fault of the driver, as well as the fault of the motor 
vehicle owner in permitting the unfit driver to use the motor 
vehicle. As in the nondelegable duty situation, the motor vehi-
cle owner's fault is vicarious in one sense and active in another. 
Therefore, the jury would be required to apportion fault for 
the separate negligent acts of the owner and driver, just as 
fault was apportioned between NSP and Conover. For pur-
poses of comparing the fault of the motor vehicle owner and 
driver to the plaintiff's fault, however, it seems clear that the 
fault of the driver would have to be imputed to the owner. The 
owner would therefore be held liable for his own negligence in 
entrusting the car to the driver, as well as the driver's negli-
gence in driving the car. 
As an example, assume that the jury determines that the mo-
tor vehicle owner is thirty percent at fault for entrusting the 
motor vehicle to the driver, that the driver is thirty percent at 
fault, and that the plaintiff is forty percent at fault. If the duties 
of the two defendants are viewed as separate duties, then the 
plaintiff's fault would be compared to the individual fault of 
each defendant. As a result, the plaintiff would be denied re-
covery because her fault would be greater than the fault of 
each individual defendant. The motor vehicle owner is both 
vicariously liable and negligent for permitting the driver to use 
the motor vehicle. The motor vehicle owner is thus responsi-
ble for his own fault (thirty percent) in entrusting the vehicle to 
the driver, and vicariously liable for the driver's negligence 
(thirty percent). Therefore, the motor vehicle owner should 
be held responsible for sixty percent of the fault. This conclu-
sion would permit the plaintiff to recover sixty percent of her 
damages against the motor vehicle owner. 
A rule permitting imputation of the fault of the driver to the 
owner, even where the owner is also negligent, should also jus-
tify imputing the fault of the independent contractor to the 
employer of the contractor. If there is an additional question 
concerning the employer's affirmative negligence, as in Cono-
ver, the jury would resolve the problem by determining what 
percentage of fault to assess against both the employer and in-
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dependent contractor. It should be unnecessary for the jury to 
distinguish between ordinary duties and nondelegable duties. 
If the employer of the independent contractor is held liable, 
based upon the standards applicable to owners of land, then a 
jury instruction covering that standard should be sufficient to 
ensure consideration of the employer's fault. A jury instruc-
tion covering the obligation of the employer to provide a safe 
place to work would establish the independent contractor's 
obligation. 
In any situation involving vicarious liability, it may be that 
there will be both vicarious liability and personal fault of the 
person who is vicariously liable. In such situations, the active 
fault of both persons will have to be split and compared, and 
separate instructions on the duties of the defendants will be 
warranted. This result, however, should not obscure the fact 
that the person held vicariously liable will be charged with a 
dual responsibility. Any contrary rule would place the plaintiff 
at a significant disadvantage, one that would be directly con-
trary to the function of vicarious responsibility.91 
C. Common and] oint Duties 
1. Joint Duties 
The fault of two or more parties may be treated as a unit in 
common and joint duty cases. The joint duty exception to the 
individual comparison rule serves to explain some cases, but 
the rule has arguably been applied too restrictively to serve as 
an exclusive standard for determining when a unit rule should 
be applied. In Minnesota, the rule was specifically adopted in 
Cambem v. Sioux Tools, Inc.,92 a post-comparative fault act case. 
The plaintiff in Cambem was injured in the course of her em-
ployment with Bayliner Boats.93 The plaintiff was using a high 
speed electric drill with a circular drill made by Sioux Tools.94 
As she was drilling holes, the bit of the drill stuck in a hole and 
twisted violently, causing her to sustain a disabling arm in-
jury.95 The drill was unsafe because its vibrations would fre-
quently loosen the forward handle. As a result, the drill 
91. See generally, PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 70. 
92. 323 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1982). 
93. Id. at 796. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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operator had to tighten the handle. There was evidence that 
the employer, Bayliner Boats, did not properly train the plain-
tiff how to operate the drill. 96 
The jury found the plaintiff to be thirty-five percent at fault, 
the manufacturer, Sioux Tools, twenty percent at fault, and 
Bayliner, the employer, forty-five percent at fault. The critical 
issue was whether the plaintiff would be entitled to recover 
against Sioux Tools, even though the percentage of fault as-
signed by the jury to Sioux Tools was less than the fault of the 
plaintiff.97 
The supreme court began its analysis with a statement of the 
Minnesota position on aggregation. "Absent proof of an eco-
nomic joint venture, current Minnesota law is clear that de-
fendants' fault is not to be aggregated in applying our 
Comparative Fault Statute."98 The plaintiff urged the court to 
adopt an additional aggregation exception, based upon the 
joint and overlapping duties owed by Bayliner Boats and Sioux 
Tools to the plaintiff. The argument rested in part on the non-
delegable duty of the manufacturer of the drill to make a safe 
product and to warn of dangers inherent in the use of the drill. 
Although the employer had a duty to warn of the known dan-
gers of drill use, the plaintiff argued that the employer's omis-
sion consisted of a failure to do what the manufacturer should 
have originally done. Based on this analysis, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the joint fault of the defendants should be con-
sidered as a single unit for comparison purposes.99 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument be-
cause the duties owed to the plaintiff by Bayliner and Sioux 
Tools were separate and distinct in nature and degree. lOo 
In arriving at its conclusion on the joint duty issue, the court 
relied on a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Reiter v. 
Dyken. 101 The Reiter court articulated a more general standard 
for deciding whether a joint duty exists, thereby justifying ag-
96. Id. at 799. 
97. Id. at 796. 
98. Id. at 798. 
99. Id. 
100. !d. at 798. The court stated the following in rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment, "[p]utting to one side the nearly impossible task of having a jury sort out what 
portions offault "overlap," the short answer is that each defendant here owed plain-
tiff separate, distinct duties, duties that differed in nature and degree." Id. 
101. 95 Wis. 2d 461, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980). 
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gregation of fault. 102 The plaintiff in Reiter was a real estate 
agent who was injured when she fell on a sloped, icy sidewalk 
while showing a house to prospective purchasers. She brought 
suit against the lister of the property and the property own-
ers.103 The special verdict form submitted the negligence of 
the plaintiff, the owner, and the plaintiff's employer to the 
jury. The jury assigned a greater percentage of negligence to 
the plaintiff than to the owners.104 Although the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court had previously indicated an intent to allow ag-
gregation in all comparative negligence cases,105 it decided in 
Reiter to adhere to its established rule limiting aggregation to 
joint duty cases.l06 The primary reason for the limitation was 
the strong legislative history underlying the Wisconsin com-
parative negligence statute. The history established that the 
legislature intended individual comparisons of negligence to 
be the rule. l07 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
property owners and plaintiff's employer did not owe the 
plaintiff a joint duty to exercise reasonable care, because of the 
differences in the duties owed to the plaintiff. lOB The owner's 
duty was based on negligence principles applicable to owners 
and occupiers, and the employer's duty was predicated on the 
Wisconsin safe place statute.l°9 In order to have a joint duty, 
the court stated the following: 
More is required than identical acts or omissions before 
the negligence of separate individuals may be combined for 
comparison purposes in determining liability. In addition, 
the duty breached and the opportunity to fulfill that duty 
must be the same, and neither the obligation nor the breach 
102. Id. at 467, 290 N.W.2d at 516. 
103. Id. at 463,290 N.W.2d at 512. 
104. The jury found the plaintiff fifty percent negligent, the owners thirty percent 
negligent, and the plaintiff's employer twenty percent negligent. Id. at 464, 290 
N.W.2d at 512. 
105. See May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 38, 264 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1978); 
Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 129, 146-48, 260 N.W.2d 36, 44-45 
(1977). 
106. 95 Wis. 2d at 474-75,290 N.W.2d at 514. 
107. Id. at 469-71,290 N.W.2d at 515-16. 
108. The court indicated that significant changes in Wisconsin's contributory neg-
ligence system should be made by the legislature. The court specifically stated that 
the legislature "is more capable of fashioning and implementing the kind of compre-
hensive solution that the multiple tortfeasor situation requires." Id. at 474, 290 
N.W.2d at 517. 
109. Id. at 467-68, 290 N.W.2d at 514. 
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of it may be divisible. 110 
The joint duty rule set forth in Reiter was first formulated by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a 1952 case, Reber v. Han-
son. III In this case, a child was fatally injured when he was 
struck by a truck. The defendant asserted that the accident was 
caused by the parent's failure to supervise the activities oftheir 
child. 112 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held: 
[T]he duty of parents to protect their child is the duty of 
both parents and it is not divisible so that either parent has 
half a duty (or some other fraction) for the breach of which 
he or she may be penalized, to that extent but no more, 
under the comparative negligence statute. Both parents are 
under the whole duty of protecting the child, to the limits of 
reasonable care, against known and present dangers and 
such duty is not divisible} I!! 
Two other Wisconsin cases, Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 114 
and Maruizza v. Kenower, 115 further illustrate both the applica-
tion and the shortcomings of the joint duty rule as formulated 
in Reber. 
In Schwenn, the plaintiff was injured when she jaywalked 
across the street in front of the Loraine Hotel, intending to 
take one of the taxis parked at the end of the hotel driveway. 
She fell on a rutted accumulation of snow and ice. The jury 
found her one-third negligent and the defendants, the Loraine 
Hotel Company and Yellow Cab Company, two-thirds negli-
gent. II6 The court concluded that both defendants exercised 
control over the driveway for purposes of snow removal. 11 7 
The court held, however, that the trial court erred in combin-
ing the negligence of the defendants. I IS The court applied the 
joint duty standard from Reber, but distinguished the facts of 
that case: 
The basis for the court's holding in that case is not present 
here. Even if the duty of the defendants to maintain the 
driveway safe were considered equal, the opportunity to so 
110. Id. at 467,290 N.W.2d at 514. 
Ill. 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952). 
Il2. /d. at 635-36,51 N.W.2d at 507. 
Il3. Id. at 637,51 N.W.2d at 508. 
Il4. 14 Wis. 2d 601, III N.W.2d 495 (1961). 
115. 68 Wis. 2d 321, 228 N.W.2d 702 (1975). 
Il6. 14 Wis. 2d at 603, III N.W.2d at 496. 
Il7. Id. 
118. Id. at 609, III N.W.2d at 499-500. 
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maintain it mayor may not have been equal. The hotel had 
someone on duty at the driveway at all times, while the cab 
company employees might be there only sporadically, espe-
cially if the taxi business was good. This is a matter for the 
jury. 119 
In Mariuzza, the plaintiff, an invitee of a lessee, was injured 
when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice while descending a 
flight of stairs. The jury found her forty percent negligent, the 
lessee forty percent negligent, and the lessor twenty percent 
negligent. 120 
One of the issues in the case was whether the trial court cor-
rectly refused to combine the negligence of the defendants for 
purposes of comparison to the plaintiff's negligence.121 The 
supreme court upheld the trial court, holding that there was no 
basis for combining the negligence of the defendants. Apply-
ing the joint duty analysis, the court stated that: 
In the case before us, not only would the duties, particularly 
as to warning a guest of ice on the rear steps, be different as 
between tenant and landlord, but the opportunities to re-
move the ice or warn the guest were not equal between the 
tenant on the premises and the landlord living in 
California. 122 
The court held that it would have been error to combine the 
negligence of the landlord and tenant. 123 
In both Schwenn and'Mariuzza the plaintiff was confronted 
with a hazard that two defendants had individual obligations to 
correct, but failed to do so. It is questionable whether a tech-
nical difference in the duty formulations that apply to each de-
fendant, or a difference in the opportunity to fulfill those 
duties should preclude application of a unit rule. 
Whether the joint duty rule should be abandoned as the ex-
clusive test for determining when the unit rule applies should 
depend on the explanation for the joint duty exception. Simi-
larly, consideration should be given to whether the explana-
tion provides a sufficient basis for limiting the use of the unit 
rule to joint duty cases. The explanation for the joint duty ex-
ception is based on the inability to separate a single duty into 
119. Id. at 610, III N.W.2d at 500. 
120. 68 Wis. at 324, 228 N.W.2d at 704. 
121. Id. at 325, 228 N.W.2d at 704. 
122. Id. at 326, 228 N.W.2d at 705. 
123. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 12 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 27 1986
1985] FAULT WITH COMPARATIVE FAULT 27 
measurable components. It may include vicarious liability 
cases, although fault does not have to be imputed for the joint 
duty rule to apply. 
The explanation contains no implicit policy justifications for 
the limitation of the unit rule only to joint duty cases. Instead, 
the Wisconsin cases have exhibited a wooden application of 
the rule, with no clear analysis of why the use of the unit rule 
should be so rigidly limited. 
2. Common Duties 
To correct the shortcomings of the joint duty rule as the sole 
means of determining when the unit rule should apply, a 
broader theory for viewing multiple defendant cases is needed. 
A solid starting point is section 878 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. Section 878 provides one means of determining 
when two or more defendants will be jointly and severally lia-
ble. 124 While section 878 was not formulated with the aggre-
gation issue in mind, it can readily be applied as a standard for 
the resolution of that issue. Section 878 applies to situations 
where a common duty exists among individuals, and failure to 
follow the duty results in a tort. In this case, each person is 
liable for the total harm resulting from the failure to follow the 
common duty. The rule rests upon the common obligation 
each party owes to avoid causing injury to the plaintiff. 125 
124. Aggregation, or application of the unit rule, should also be justified where 
the defendants have engaged in concerted action. Section 876 of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, covers persons acting in concert. It reads as follows: 
For hann resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, 
one is subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a com-
mon design with him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other in accom-
plishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, con-
stitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). The theory applies in situations 
where intentional torts have been committed by those acting in concert, and it also 
applies in cases where there is negligent action by two or more defendants. See id., 
comments a-e. Parties may act in concert without an express agreement. The agree-
ment may be implied to exist from the conduct of the parties, as in a situation where 
two car drivers suddenly and without consultation agree to race on a public highway. 
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 46. 
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 878. Section 878 provides: "If two or 
more persons are under a common duty and failure to perfonn it amounts to tortious 
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Neither the obligation nor the opportunity to fulfill the duty 
need be the same. As the comment points out, one party may 
have the burden of performance, but there still may be a com-
mon duty.l26 
One of the illustrations to section 878 involves a situation 
similar to that in Mariuzza. The comment's illustration pro-
vides: 
A rents a house to B, with a covenant in the lease that 
upon notice of defects A will keep the premises in repair. B 
subleases the house to C, with a similar covenant. C moves 
into the house. After six months the plaster in the parlor 
ceiling becomes dangerously defective. C notifies A and B 
requesting repair, but neither A nor B performs his cove-
nant. The ceiling falls and injures C. Both A and B are sub-
ject to liability to C for the entire harm. 127 
Although there was no covenant in Mariuzza, and the injury 
was not to a tenant, the duty was owed to the guest of the ten-
ant by both the owner of the building and the lessee of the 
building. In the illustration, both A and B owed an obligation, 
pursuant to different covenants, to make the repairs. While 
the duty may have been the same, the opportunity to fulfill the 
duty was not necessarily the same. According to the Restate-
ment, however, it is not necessary that the opportunity to fulfill 
the duty be the same. Moreover, the parties may have con-
tracted for the performance of the duty by one of the parties. 
Under the Restatement rule, neither the duty nor the opportu-
nity to fulfill the duty need be the same. 
In situations where two or more defendants have the obliga~ 
tion to correct a hazardous condition, there is no clear reason 
conduct, each is subject to liability for the entire harm resulting from the failure to 
perform the duty." Id. 
126. Id. Comment a to § 878 provides: 
In some situations two or more persons have a duty to perform an act or 
remedy a condition. In these cases the performance of the duty by either 
relieves the other from liability. If the duty is not performed, each is liable 
for all the harm resulting from its breach. This is true although as between 
themselves one of them has the burden of performance and although their 
interests in the subject matter are unequal. Thus the rule applies to part-
ners or persons engaged in a common enterprise made liable for the non-
performance of a nondelegable duty, and to co-owners of any form of 
tangible things that do harm, such as joint tenants of a dangerously' defec-
tive building that falls upon persons in the highway. 
Id. comment a. 
127. Id. comment a, illustration 2. 
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why the duty must be equal. In Morden v. Mullins, 128 the court 
concluded that two adjacent lakeshore property owners, who 
jointly constructed, maintained, and used a floating boat dock, 
had a common duty to ensure that the float would not cause 
injury, notwithstanding the fact that the co-owners obligations 
to fulfill the duty might be unequal: 
Co-owners or tenants in common owe to third persons a 
duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining their property 
in such manner as to avoid injury to third persons, and this 
is true although the actual management of the property is 
by agreement vested exclusively in one of the owners.129 
Despite the co-ownership of the float, the court held that it was 
a jury question as to whether one of the co-owners was negli-
gent at all in the maintenance of the float. uo One of the co-
owners alleged that the negligence in the maintenance of the 
float was solely attributable to the other co-owner. 131 
Both owners are liable as such for negligence in the mainte-
nance of the property, and where both knew and acquiesced 
in either leaving the float overnight in a navigable part of 
the lake, without lights or reflectors, and under the other 
conditions alleged, indubitably it is a jury question as to 
whether these facts constituted improper maintenance of 
the equipment, and whether such maintenance is charge-
able to either or both of the defendants. 132 
It thus appears that a common duty may exist even in situa-
tions where there is no imputed negligence. The common 
duty rests upon the obligation of each party to avoid the haz-
ard. Even though negligence must be proven against each de-
fendant, the unitary nature of the obligation establishes that 
the duty is no more divisible than in situations where there is 
imputed negligence. 
In Schwenn, the same analysis could be applied. In this case, 
the taxi cab company and hotel had effective control over the 
slippery area. 133 Both defendants had the obligation to correct 
that condition, and both were found negligent for failing either 
to warn of or to correct the dangerous condition. Even if the 
128. 115 Ga. App. 92, 153 S.E.2d 629 (1967). 
129. Id. at 93, 153 S.E.2d at 630 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 878). 
130. /d. at 94, 153 S.E.2d at 630. 
131. Id. at 93-94, 153 S.E.2d at 630. 
132. Id. at 94-95, 153 S.E.2d at 631. 
133. 14 Wis. 2d at 607, III N.W.2d at 498. 
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parties had an equal duty to maintain the driveway in a safe 
condition, the Schwenn court would have refused to combine 
the fault of the defendants because the opportunity to fulfill 
the duty might not have been exactly the same. For purposes 
of finding a common duty, however, this requirement would 
seem to be the least essential. 
The critical factor in the analysis should be that two or more 
parties have control, or the right to control over, a particular 
instrumentality or condition, and fail to exercise reasonable 
care to prevent injury to the plaintiff. If both factors are pres-
ent, a unit rule that tracks section 878 of the Restatement 
rather than the joint duty rule in Reber v. Hanson,134 is more 
satisfactory. As a matter of fairness, the plaintiff's right to re-
cover is not diminished by the number of defendants who have 
the duty and ability to correct a dangerous condition but fail to 
do so. The focus is on the hazard created by the defendants, 
rather than on the separate fault of the defendants. 
3. Common Duties, Products Liability, and the 
Chain of Distribution 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to have applied just 
such an analysis in products liability cases. In City of Franklin v. 
Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,135 a products liability case, a fire 
truck was damaged when it tipped over while making a turn on 
the way to answering a fire alarm. Suit was brought by the City 
of Franklin against Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., which han-
dled the sale of the truck, Gunite Division of Kelsey Hayes, the 
manufacturer of the truck wheels, and Ford Motor, the manu-
facturer of the chassis. 136 The issue concerned the method of 
submitting such a case to the jury. The court took the follow-
ing position: 
The comparative negligence question would have answered 
what percentage of negligence was to be attributed to the 
city and what percentage to the defendants. The problem 
comes, in a multiple defendant case, that no similar alloca-
tion of comparative negligence was included in the verdict 
as to each of the defendants. From the standpoint of the 
134. The joint duty rule in Reber was that the "duty to protect was joint, the op-
portunity to protect was equal, as a matter of law neither the obligation nor the 
breach of it was divisible." 260 Wis. at 633, 51 N.W.2d at 505. 
135. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973). 
136. Id. at 647-48,207 N.W.2d at 869. 
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plaintiff, it is enough that, under strict liability and without 
regard to the exercise of all possible care, the seller, assem-
bler and maker are held liable to it for the defective con-
struction of the wheel. However, as between multiple 
defendants, as to their right to contribution from anyone of 
the others, it is not enough. On the finding that the defec-
tive wheel caused the accident, the trial court found all 
three defendants liable to the plaintiff. Left unanswered 
and unanswerable was, as between these multiple defen-
dants, what percentage of the judgment was to be allocated 
to each in determining the right to contribution between 
them. lg7 
31 
The special verdict form that was submitted to the jury asked 
them to apportion 100 percent of the negligence, first to 
"the defective condition of the wheel," and second, to the 
plaintiff. lgS 
In Franklin, the court's treatment of the fault of multiple de-
fendants has the same effect as application of the joint duty 
rule from Reber. The fault of the defendants is treated as a unit 
for purposes of comparison to the plaintiff's negligence, even 
though the prerequisites of joint duty were not established. 
The case, however, might be covered by the common duty 
standards from section 878 of the Restatement. lg9 
Franklin is clearly a deviation from the joint duty rule applied 
in Reber. While the defendants might owe different duties to 
the plaintiff, or have different opportunities to avoid the prod-
uct defect, all three defendants contributed to or failed to dis-
cover the defect in the truck. The resulting risk was indivisible, 
and as in the vicarious liability and joint duty cases, the obliga-
tions of the defendants could be separated. The obligations 
must be separated for purposes of contribution. The risk cre-
ated by the defendants is an indivisible risk, as the court 
pointed out in Garbincius. 140 
Extending the unit rule to cases such as Franklin could be 
justified by the application of the common duty rule in section 
878. The logic of such an extension is apparent. If the de-
137. Id. at 651-52, 207 N.W.2d at 871. 
138. Id. at 651, 207 N.W.2d at 870-71. 
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 878. The comment to this section states 
that the rule applies to "persons engaged in a common enterprise." The rule applies 
even though their interests in the subject matter are of unequal proportion. Id. com-
ment a. 
140. 621 F.2d at 1176. 
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fendants in Franklin acted pursuant to a fonnal contract that 
contained the elements necessary for a joint venture, then the 
unit rule would apply. This would justify comparing the plain-
tiff's fault to the aggregate fault of the defendants, even 
though, as in Krengel, it would be possible to assign individual 
percentages of fault to the defendants for failing to correct the 
product defect.141 As in Garbincius, the plaintiff is confronted 
with a single hazard, which several defendants contributed to 
or failed to discover. 142 
From the plaintiff's perspective, however, the hazard is the 
same irrespective of the formal relationship among the defend-
ants. To illustrate, assume that the facts are the same as in 
Krengel; specifically, that the same defendants manufactured, 
distributed, serviced, and placed the photo booth in the dimes-
tore. In addition, assume that the plaintiff's fault is equal to or 
greater than the fault of the three defendants. Also assume 
that there is no contract creating a fonnal joint venture. A 
strict application of the individual comparison rule makes the 
plaintiff's right to recover turn on the presence of the written 
agreement betweeri the defendants. 
Application of the common duty analysis from the Restate-
ment avoids this inconsistency by focusing on the indivisible 
nature of the risk created by the defendants. In addition, the 
liability of one or more parties may be derivative in products 
liability cases involving several defendants in the chain of man-
ufacture and distribution. Multiplying the number of defend-
ants who are liable because they are conduits in the chain of 
distribution, or because they negligently fail to discover the 
product defect, does not alter the nature of the hazard. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also considered how to 
treat parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution in 
Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 143 through a concurring and dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Simonett. The plaintiff in Hudson was 
injured when a dump truck box dropped on his shoulder. Suit 
was brought against Perfection-Cobey Company, the manufac-
turer of the hoist that raised the box of the dump truck; Poto-
mac Ford Truck Sales, Inc., the dealer that supplied the chassis 
on which the box was mounted; and Snyder, the truck assem-
141. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841. 
142. 621 F.2d 1171. 
143. 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982). 
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bler.144 Perfection impleaded the plaintiff's employer, Jack L. 
Olsen, Inc., requesting contribution or indemnity. The jury 
found each defendant liable to the plaintiff on negligence and 
strict liability theories. The jury apportioned twenty percent of 
the fault to the plaintiff, thirty-five percent to Snyder, twenty-
five percent to Perfection, zero percent to Potomac, and twenty 
percent to Olsen. 145 
One of the issues in the case was whether the jury's findings 
that Potomac was strictly liable and negligent could be recon-
ciled with the finding of zero percent fault. The majority re-
solved the problem by stating that the evidence did not 
support a finding of negligence on the part of Potomac. 146 As 
a result, only the strict liability finding remained. The court 
concluded that although Potomac sold Olsen a defective truck, 
the jury found that Potomac was not responsible for the defect 
in the truck. The court found the jury's answers, so character-
ized, to be consistent. 147 
Justice Simonett, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
would have directly addressed the problem. He likewise found 
the jury's findings to be consistent, but he offered a different 
explanation: 
As the majority opinion points out, this only means the jury 
found that Potomac sold a defective truck but that Potomac 
'was not responsible for the defect.' I do not understand 
the majority to mean by this that Potomac is not liable to 
plaintiffs in strict liability, only that Potomac's liability 
'stems solely from its passive role as the retailer of a defec-
tive product furnished to it by the manufacturer.' . ; . In 
other words, Potomac is liable to plaintiffs but only in a vi-
carious or derivative sense as the inert seller in the market-
ing chain. This is not the kind of conduct that needs to be 
included in a comparative fault question, and the jury prop-
erly ignored it. Potomac should be found liable to plaintiffs 
but entitled to indemnity from the other defendants 
148 
The problem of adding redundant defendants to the fault 
comparison question is clearly recognized. The fault of the de-
144. Id. at 151. 
145. Id. at 154. 
146. Id. at 157. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 158 (Simonett, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted). 
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fendant, who is only derivatively liable, should not be the sub-
ject of a separate assessment of fault by the jury any more than 
would the fault of a vicariously liable master or automobile 
owner. 
The only potential impediment to the adoption of the analy-
sis suggested by Justice Simonett in Hudson is the legislative 
history underlying the 1978 amendment to the comparative 
fault statute. If a party strictly liable and negligent is not in-
cluded in the comparative fault comparison, then that party 
and all others in the chain of distribution would be liable for 
the fault of the party who was actively at fault, the party who 
manufactured the product. If the manufacturer is unable to 
pay its share of the judgment, then a party lower in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution would be liable for the full share 
of the manufacturer's fault. 
Given the individual comparisons of fault that the legislature 
appeared to support in 1978 when the comparative negligence 
statute was converted into a comparative fault statute, and 
given the particular emphasis on products liability cases, it is 
questionable whether the individual comparisons of fault can 
be avoided without violating the legislative intent. The return 
of the comparative fault statute to individual comparisons of 
fault indicates a legislative concern that parties in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution should be able to avoid liability 
when less at fault than the plaintiff. This stems from a concern 
in 1978 that a party whose fault is less than the fault of the 
plaintiff would be held liable for the damages sustained by the 
plaintiff, less the plaintiff's percentage of fault. 
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act,149 provided the model 
for two of the changes in the Minnesota comparative negli-
gence act.150 The intent was to broaden the responsibility 
among parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution. 
The Act's broad definition of fault provides for the comparison 
of all basic theories of recovery, including negligence, strict lia-
bility, and breach of implied warranty. Such a broad definition 
149. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1985). The Unifonn 
Act provided the basis for the definition of "fault" in MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 
l(a) (1984) and the loss reallocation provision in MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 
(1984). The definition of "fault" in the Minnesota statute is set out supra, at note 34. 
See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT l(b), 2(d). 
150. See Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 388 (1978). 
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facilitates the comparison, even in situations that could ulti-
mately fit within the indemnity rules established by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court. 
If the fault of the intermediary is not included in the compar-
ison question on the special verdict form, the jury will not have 
an opportunity to assess a percentage of fault against the de-
fendant. As recognized in Franklin, that percentage may be im-
portant for purposes of determining the amount of 
contribution that will be appropriate, if it is determined that 
contribution, rather than indemnity, is the appropriate rem-
edy.151 In addition, separate percentages would have to be as-
sessed for purposes of applying subdivision three of Minnesota 
Statutes section 604.02, which states that a defendant whose 
fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff will be held liable only 
for his percentage of fault. 152 
Given the uncertainty that exists over the status of contribu-
tion and indemnity rules in products liability cases in Minne-
sota, the safest route may be to submit individual comparisons 
of fault. A unit rule could then be applied to aggregate the 
fault of the defendants in the chain, based on a common duty 
analysis. 153 
While concern was expressed in the 1978 Minnesota Legisla-
ture over products liability problems,154 there are three addi-
tional considerations that may support application of the unit 
rule. First, in 1985, when considering the aggregation bill, the 
legislative committees expressed concern over a requirement 
of individual comparisons in products liability cases. 155 The 
application of the unit rule depends on how binding the legis-
lative intent expressed in the 1978 legislature is on the com-
parison question. It seems quite clear that the legislature did 
not consider the problems that the individual comparison rule 
creates for a person injured by the actions or inactions of mul-
tiple defendants. 
Finally, any concern expressed over the problems involved 
in holding intermediaries in the chain of manufacture and dis-
151. 58 Wis. 2d at 652, 207 N.W.2d at 871-72. 
152. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3. 
153. See Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1980) (defec-
tive manufacturing of snowmobile gas tanks); Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 
N.W.2d 782, 788-89 (Minn. 1977) (defective heater). 
154. See Senate Debate on H.F. No. 338, supra note 42. 
155. See Civil Law Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 58. 
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tribution strictly liable has been alleviated somewhat by the 
adoption of Minnesota Statutes section 544.41.156 The statute 
permits a party lower in the chain to opt out from strict liability 
if there is a solvent manufacturer subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in Minnesota. 157 
If the Franklin rule is adopted, the method of dealing with 
the problem is different from the method that would have been 
applied by Justice Simonett in Hudson. The justification, how-
ever, is the same. Both methods are designed to avoid the 
problems created by the addition of parties in the chain of dis-
tribution whose liability is only derivative. 
If neither method is followed in products liability cases, an-
other approach remains. A method could be used that tracks 
the indemnity rules that have been applied in products liability 
cases in Minnesota. If the fault of an intermediary in the chain 
of manufacture and distribution is derivative, as was the fault 
of Potomac in Hudson, it may be justifiable to impute the fault 
of the intermediary to the product manufacturer. Assume, for 
example, that a jury finds the plaintiff forty percent at fault, the 
product manufacturer thirty percent at fault, and the interme-
diary thirty percent at fault. If the intermediary's fault is deriv-
ative, that fault would be imputed to the manufacturer, who 
would then be responsible for sixty percent of the plaintiff's 
damages. The intermediary would not be held liable because 
its fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff. The result is justi-
fied exactly because the intermediary's fault is derivative. 158 
156. MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1984). 
157. [d. 
158. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet considered the relationship be-
tween aggregation rules and the rule governing indemnity. The position taken in 
this Article is that aggregation, or application of the unit rule, is justified whenever 
two or more defendants are in a relationship to each other such that one defendant is 
entitled to indemnity from the other. 
The basic indemnity rules were summarized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 
(1960). The court stated that indemnity is justified in the following situations: 
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivitive or vicarious lia-
bility for damage caused by the one sought to be charged. 
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the 
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be 
charged. 
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a 
breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged. 
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because 
of failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of 
the one sought to be charged. 
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4. Common Duties and Indivisible Hazards 
A final area that creates problems is where the injury to the 
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties containing an 
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character involved. 
Id. at 372, 104 N.W.2d at 848. 
In its attempt to achieve substantial justice in individual cases without being 
bound by "hard-and-fast" rules, the court has allowed indemnity without classifying 
cases within any of the Hendrickson rules. Utilizing primary/secondary or ac-
tive/passive distinctions to justify the grant of indemnity, the court generated a set of 
flexible rules to support indemnity awards. 
The court re-evaluated its traditional indemnity rules in 1977 in Tolbert v. 
Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977), a products liability case. After 
isolating the first three categories of indemnity, based on the distinction that in those 
cases the party seeking indemnity has not been culpably at fault, the court concen-
trated on the fourth indemnity category. The court found that the fourth category of 
indemnity differed from the first three because it permitted an award of indenmity 
even to a party who was negligent. Id. at 367. The court found that the usual distinc-
tions between active and passive, or primary and secondary fault that had been used 
to determine whether indemnity would be appropriate in category four cases, were 
confusing and necessitated complex analysis. The court purported to abolish those 
distinctions and instead to allocate loss in such cases according to contribution based 
upon relative fault. Id. 
However, notwithstanding the holding in Tolbert, the supreme court has left open 
the availability of indemnity in products liability cases, even in those cases that ini-
tially appear to fit within the fourth indemnity category. In Frey v. Montgomery Ward 
& Co., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977), a products liability case which ostensibly fit 
within the fourth category of indemnity, the court raised the possibility that category 
three indemnity might be appropriate, even though the retailer of the defective prod-
uct was found to be negligent. 
More recently, in Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1980), 
the court was also presented with a case that seemingly fell within the fourth cate-
gory. Polaris, a snowmobile manufacturer, entered into an agreement with Plastics, 
Inc., to purchase 26,000 plastic gas tanks for its snowmobiles. Plastics had ordered 
the polyethylene resin necessary to make the gas tanks from Fusion Rubbermaid. 
The tanks performed satisfactorily during the winter months, but in warmer weather 
the plastic material absorbed gasoline and more than 23,000 tanks failed. Seven 
thousand of the tanks were replaced. Polaris brought suit against Plastics for the loss 
incurred as a result of the defective tanks. Plastics joined Fusion Rubbermaid, seek-
ing indemnity. 
The jury found Plastics negligent with respect to the information supplied con-
cerning the suitability of the tanks for snowmobiles. Plastics was also found liable on 
the basis of breach of express warranty and implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose. Id. 
The trial court awarded Plastics indemnity from Fusion. On appeal Fusion ar-
gued that the trial court should have submitted the comparative negligence of Plas-
tics and Fusion to the jury, and that Fusion should only be liable for contribution. 
The supreme court held that although the trial court might have submitted the com-
parative negligence issue to the jury under other circumstances, it was proper to re-
fuse to do so under the facts of the case. Id. at 420. 
The indemnity award was sustained on two bases. First, although application of 
Tolbert would appear to require contribution rather than indemnity, the court held 
that Tolbert was inapplicable because the events giving rise to the litigation occurred 
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plaintiff is the result of an indivisible hazard to which several 
eight or nine years before Tolbert was decided, and therefore Tolbert was inapplicable 
whether or not Plastics had relied on the decision. Id. 
Second, the court determined that the indemnity award was justified on the basis 
of the first indemnity category in Hendrickson. Given the fact that Fusion misled Plas-
tics with assurances that the polyethylene resin had been tested without any indica-
tion of failure, and that Plastics relied on those assurances, in the court's opinion 
Plastics was merely a conduit for supplying Polaris with Fusion's misinformation. Id. 
The court held that indemnity was justified because the party seeking indemnity "has 
only a derivative or vicarious liability for the damage caused by the one sought to be 
charged." Id. 
Resolution of the indemnity claim based on a reclassification of cases that osten-
sibly fall within the four Hendrickson categories of indemnity seemingly avoids the 
problems the supreme court had with the active/passive analysis used to resolve 
products liability indemnity claims prior to Tolbert. 
The fluidity of the rules generally applied to determine whether indemnity is 
appropriate is illustrated by the similarity in indemnity nomenclatures. For example, 
the first four Hendrickson indemnity categories could readily be reshaped to fit within 
three, more general indemnity tests, the "active-passive," "primary-secondary," and 
"implied contractual indemnity" tests. See Landes & Posner, joint and Multiple 
Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 517, 532-35 (1979). Depending on 
the fact situation, the "primary-secondary" test could encompass the first four Hen-
drickson categories. Implied contractual indemnity could readily encompass the third 
category in Hendrickson, and the fourth category could readily fit within either the 
"active-passive" or "primary-secondary" rules. 
It is this fluidity in indemnity classifications, see id. at 533-35, and the consistency 
in the policy justifications for the indemnity rules, see id. at 535-37, that makes deci-
sions such as those in Polaris possible and understandable. The generic similarity of 
indemnity tests is thus illustrated, whether indemnity in products liability cases is 
based on "active-passive" or "primary-secondary" indemnity, or the vicarious or de-
rivative liability indemnity category under the court's reclassification in that case. In 
vicarious or derivative liability cases, granting indemnity to the person held vicari-
ously liable justifiably limits the harshness of the vicarious liability rule which results 
in the imposition of a form of strict liability on the party seeking indemnity. As a 
matter of fairness, the loss is shifted to the party who is actively at fault. Cf. id. at 533-
35. To the extent that "derivative" liability fits within this indemnity category, in-
demnity is justified because of the justifiable reliance by the party seeking indemnity 
on the representations of the party from whom indemnity is sought. See Polaris, 299 
N.W.2d at 420. 
In the second Hendrickson category, where the party seeking indemnity has in-
curred liability because he acted at the direction and in the interest of the one from 
whom indemnity is sought, indemnity is supported because of the justifiable reliance 
on the directions given by the party sought to be charged. The party who induces the 
other to act, presumably for his own benefit, should bear the responsibility for the 
acts of the agent. 
In the third Hendrickson category, the party seeking indemnity has been held lia-
ble because of the breach of a duty owed to him by the party from whom indemnity is 
sought. If, pursuant to contract or otherwise, the party from whom indemnity is 
sought has assumed the duty to act, the burden to avoid injury may be shifted to that 
party. The reliance factor again is important in supporting indemnity in such situa-
tions. 
In the fourth category, the party seeking indemnity has been held liable because 
of a failure even though negligent, to discover or to prevent the misconduct of the 
HeinOnline -- 12 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 39 1986
1985] FAULT WITH COMPARATIVE FAULT 39 
parties have contributed. The problem could arise in various 
cases, including those involving hazardous working conditions, 
pollution and hazardous waste cases, and dram shop cases. 
one sought to be charged. The reliance factor appears to be of critical importance in 
determining the appropriateness of indemnity. Where the party seeking indemnity 
has not only an opportunity, but also has a duty to inspect the product, indemnity 
may be precluded. Under such circumstances, an alternative description of the result 
is that reliance on the other party's expertise is not justifiable. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has used the term "concurrent" fault to describe such situations. 
Landes and Posner have offered an additional justification for the indemnity 
rules. Aside from promoting deterrence, they have argued that the indemnity rules 
are intuitively efficient. By shifting the entire loss to the party who is deemed primar-
ily liable, indemnity avoids suboptimal results by insuring that there will not be an 
overinvestment in safety by requiring two parties to exercise reasonable care when 
reasonable care exercised by only one of the parties would avoid the injury. In these 
alternative care cases, the indemnity rules result in a shifting of loss to the party who 
is best able to avoid the loss. See Landes Be Posner, supra, at 533-35. 
The policy justifications of reliance and economic efficiency are the common 
thread running through the supreme court's indemnity decisions, despite the indem-
nity classifications that are superficially used to justify indemnity. Based upon Polaris 
and Frey, it seems that even after Tolbert, considerations other than simple classifica-
tion of indemnity claims will continue to be important. Where the court deems it 
important to protect the reliance interest, or where it is apparent that loss should be 
imposed on the party best able to avoid the loss, indemnity may be appropriate, even 
if the facts initially seem to fit within the fourth Hendrickson indemnity category. 
In any case where indemnity is appropriate, aggregation is justified. If the Hen-
drickson categories of indemnity are utilized as guidelines, any case that falls within 
the first three categories should justify application of the unit rule to the defendants 
who are in the position of the indemnitor and indemnitee. Any apparent category 
four products liability case that is reclassified should also justify application of the 
unit rule. 
It is arguable that aggregation is appropriate even in cases that fit within Hen-
drickson's fourth category of indemnity cases. The circumstances of category four 
cases may require contribution rather than indemnity as the means of allocating loss 
among parties in the chain of distribution. It is still possible, however, to utilize the 
active-passive fault distinction to determine when aggregation will be appropriate. If 
a party is negligent in failing to discover a product defect, Tolbert precludes indemnity 
in favor of contribution. The rights of the defendants inter se, however, should not 
influence the treatment of these defendants for purposes of the fault comparison 
issue. Where there is negligent but passive conduct on the part of the manufacturer 
in marketing a defective product, fault may be split among the defendants. Applica-
tion of the unit rule is justifiable because of the derivative nature of the retailer's 
liability, as in other vicarious liability cases. 
In the alternative, if indemnity is not allowed in category four products liability 
cases, and if individual comparisons are held to be the rule, it is nonetheless arguable 
that the passive fault of a party lower in the chain of distribution should be imputed 
to the product manufacturer who was actively at fault in introducing a defective prod-
uct into the stream of commerce. Therefore, even in cases where a plaintiff's fault is 
greater than the fault of an intermediary in the chain of distribution, that intermedi-
ary's fault should be imputed to the manufacturer who has a nondelegable duty to 
make a product safe. 
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Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 159 is a good illustration 
of the problem. Borel was a suit by an industrial insulation 
worker against certain manufacturers of insulation materials 
that contained asbestos. The plaintiff alleged that he con-
tracted asbestosis and mesothelioma because of his exposure 
to the defendants' products over a thirty-three year period. 160 
The court noted the causation problems that arise: 
In the instant case, it is impossible, as a practical matter, 
to determine with absolute certainty which particular expo-
sure to asbestos dust resulted in injury to Borel. It is undis-
puted, however, that Borel contracted asbestosis from 
inhaling asbestos dust and that he was exposed to the prod-
ucts of all the defendants on many occasions. It was also 
established that the effect of exposure to asbestos dust is 
cumulative, that is, each exposure may result in an addi-
tional and separate injury. We think, therefore, that on the 
basis of strong circumstantial evidence the jury could find 
that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to 
Borel. 161 
Because of the indivisible nature of the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff, the court concluded that the defendants would be 
held jointly and severally liable for those injuries. 162 
Borel differs from other products liability cases, such as 
Franklin 163 and Hudson,l64 because the dispersal of fault in 
those cases is the result of the joinder of several parties in the 
chain of manufacture and distribution. In such cases, some of 
the parties have failed to discover the fault of the other parties. 
In cases such as Borel, several defendants have contributed to 
an indivisible hazard through the marketing of their own prod-
ucts and through independent, unrelated conduct. 
If the unit rule is applied to products liability cases to justify 
aggregating the fault of unrelated defendants in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution, based on the rationale that the 
focus should be on the hazard created by the product, the unit 
rule can be applied just as readily to cases such as Borel. The 
hazard created by the active conduct of several parties is an 
159. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
160. !d. at 1081. 
161. Id. at 1094. 
162. Id. at 1096. 
163. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866. 
164. 326 N.W.2d 149. 
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indivisible hazard. The most logical comparison of the plain-
tiff's fault is to the hazard to which he was exposed, rather than 
to the individual percentages of fault assigned to the several 
asbestos manufacturers joined in the litigation. 
The same approach should apply in cases in which several 
defendants have discharged pollutants that injure the plaintiff 
or damage the plaintiff's property. The unit rule can also be 
applied in drams hop cases where several dramshops have 
mace illegal sales of intoxicating liquor. The activities of sev-
eral defendants in a case involving air or water pollution may 
result in an indivisible hazard that cannot be broken into ap-
portionable harms. 165 The illegal sale of intoxicating liquor by 
several dramshops may combine to create a single hazard, the 
intoxicated driver. In each case, as in other joint and common 
duty cases, the plaintiff's right to recover diminishes in inverse 
proportion to the number of defendants who contribute to the 
hazard. Application of the unit rule avoids this problem. 
Extension of the unit rule to cases in which defendants have 
acted independently, but their actions have created an indivisi-
ble hazard, may be supported as a logical application of the 
common duty analysis. Extension may be criticized because 
there is no apparent means of limiting the scope of the unit 
rule once that extension is made. It might be argued that ap-
plication of the unit rule to industrial hazard, pollution, or 
dram shop cases, would also require application of the unit 
rule to cases such as automobile accident cases, where two or 
more drivers have driven negligently and created a risk of in-
jury to the plaintiff, who is harmed in the ensuing collision. 
There are several answers to the problem. It might be ar-
gued that in cases such as industrial hazard or pollution cases, 
the fault of the plaintiff is likely to be passive, whereas in auto-
mobile accident cases the fault of the plaintiff is likely to create 
a risk of injury to the defendants as well as himself. Also, it is 
arguable that injured persons are most likely to be victimized 
by the individual comparison rule in the industrial injury, pol-
lution, or dram shop cases. While there may be multiple vehi-
cle collisions, the number of participants is not likely to equal 
those in the other indivisible hazard cases. Finally, it might be 
argued that the indivisible hazard cases are distinguishable 
165. For standards applicable to appportionment of damages. see Mitchell v. 
Volkswagenwerk AG. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law). 
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from the automobile accident cases because the defendants 
will generally create dissimilar risks of injury. In the indivisible 
hazard cases, the defendants will have created similar risks of 
injury which contribute to and perhaps magnify the risk of in-
jury to the plaintiff. 
The line that separates the two types of cases may be ragged. 
Drawing the line short of applying the unit rule in all cases of 
joint and several liability, so that it applies only where the de-
fendants have through the breach of the same duty created the 
same risk of injury to the plaintiff, may be justified because it 
corrects what are likely to be the most significant abuses cre-
ated by the individual comparison rule. 
IV. A STATUTORY RESOLUTION 
Once the decision is made to adopt a modified comparative 
fault statute or rule, legislatures and courts have had to choose 
between individual comparisons or aggregate comparisons of 
fault. The criticisms of both rules assume that there is no mid-
dle ground that would justify aggregation in some, but not all, 
multiple party cases. The major problem with the individual 
comparison rule is that the plaintiff's recovery diminishes in 
inverse proportion to the number of persons who have con-
tributed to a hazardous condition or failed to discover or cor-
rect it. 
There are various legislative or judicial adjustments to the 
rule which could be made to resolve part of the problem. For 
example, the comparative fault statute could be amended to 
make it clear that only the fault of parties in the lawsuit should 
be considered. Alternatively, the rule of joint and severallia-
bility could be coupled with an aggregate comparison rule as a 
tradeoff for the plaintiff's right to recover against defendants 
less at fault than the plaintiff. 
There is a middle ground that has not been considered. 
Legislative adoption of the theory of the indivisible hazard 
would justify aggregation in various areas that have created 
particular problems for persons faced with multiple party liti-
gation. An amendment to the Minnesota comparative fault act 
which would accomplish that result is as follows: 
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by 
any person or his legal representative to recover damages 
for fault resulting in death or injury to person or property, 
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if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of 
fault attributable to the person recovering. 
If the actions or inactions of two or more persons result in the crea-
tion of or failure to correct an indivisible hazard, their fault shall be 
combined. In such cases, contributory fault of a person or his legal 
representative shall not bar recovery if the contributory fault was not 
greater than the fault of the persons against whom recovery is sought, 
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the 
amount of fault attributable to the person seeking recovery. 
43 
The theory resolves at least some of the problems created by 
the individual comparison rule, without constituting a com-
plete acceptance of the aggregation rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary debate over comparative fault is whether pure 
or modified comparative fault should be adopted. Once modi-
fied comparative fault is adopted, the comparison question 
focuses on whether there should be individual or unit compari-
sons of fault. 
The debate over the issue has polarized around two posi-
tions taken by the courts in Arkansas and Wisconsin, which de-
veloped early and became the model for other jurisdictions 
deciding the issue. The alternatives were either to adopt an 
aggregate comparison approach or an individual comparison 
rule. The only clear exception to the individual comparison 
rule is when two or more parties have a joint duty to exercise 
reasonable care. 
Given the variety of multiple party cases that may arise, it is 
obvious that the joint duty rule is not broad enough to fairly 
resolve the different types of cases that may call for application 
of a unit rule. The basic approach taken in this Article has fo-
cused more on the hazard created by multiple parties, rather 
than on individual comparisons of the plaintiff's fault with the 
individual fault of the defendants who have created or failed to 
discover or correct a hazardous condition. There are several 
parts to the rule. 
First, vicarious liability cases should always combine the fault 
of the passively and actively at fault parties. There is no basis 
for splitting fault in such cases. If fault is split, for contribution 
purposes, in a vicarious liability case such as a joint venture, 
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the fault should be aggregated for purposes of comparison to 
the plaintiff's percentage of fault. 
Second, in cases where the joint duty exception applies, the 
fault of the parties who owe the joint duty should be aggre-
gated. Aside from vicarious liability cases, the joint duty ex-
ception is the clearest exception to the individual comparison 
rule. The remaining exceptions depend on the closeness of 
the fact situations to the joint duty rule. 
Third, where there is not a joint duty, but a common duty 
that satisfies the elements of the Restatement, the fault of all 
parties who breach that common duty should be aggregated. 
The common duty rule absorbs and broadens the joint duty 
rule. 
Fourth, even in cases that may not meet the requirements of 
the common duty rule, extension of the unit rule to cases in-
volving the creation of indivisible hazards by several defend-
ants is justified. 
In all situations in this Article where the suggestion is made 
that the unit rule applies, the problem facing claimants is the 
same-the greater the number of defendants, the less likely 
that the plaintiff will recover. 
The primary counter argument that may be made to the 
adoption of a more flexible unit rule is that a plaintiff not enti-
tled to recover against a single defendant less at fault than the 
plaintiff will be entitled to recover against several defendants 
less at fault than the plaintiff. However, for purposes of illus-
tration, if the focus is on the hazard created by a single defend-
ant or multiple defendants, there is no inconsistency. In each 
situation, the basic focus is on the plaintiff's fault as balanced 
against the hazard created by the individual defendant or mul-
tiple defendants. If the plaintiff is more than one-half at fault 
in causing his own injuries, recovery is denied. On the other 
hand, if the plaintiff is one-half at fault or less, and the hazard 
to which the plaintiff is exposed is one-half or more responsi-
ble for the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
irrespective of the number of defendants who were involved in 
creating the indivisible hazard. 
Use of the unit rule in such cases represents a fair approach 
to the problems created by multiple party litigation. 
